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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

C.E. BUTTERS OR BETTY BUTTERS,
*

Plaintiffs/Appellees,

*
v.

Case No. 950361

*
*

TINA JACKSON and
KELLY NORTON,
*

Priority No. 15

Defendants/Appellants•
APPELLANTS' PETITION FOR REHEARING
INTRODUCTION
In its decision filed May 9, 1996, this court reviewed
language in a residential lease between the parties which provided:
Furniture, fixtures and personal property of tenant may
not be removed from the premises until rent or other
charges are fully paid.
This court affirmed the trial court decision and found the language
established a contractual lien and a security interest in all of
the tenants' property, including exempt property, justifying the
landlords' retention of the property (and an assumed future right
to sell or otherwise dispose of the property). The decision upheld
the trial court's finding that the landlords need not follow Utah
Code §78-36-10.5, the eviction statute.
This ruling went far beyond Utah precedent and was done
without the benefit of briefing on this issue.

The decision is

likely to have a serious impact on thousands of Utah renters who
will unwittingly and unintentionally lose their personal property

1

based on a document they thought was only a lease, not a lien
agreement.

For the reasons discussed herein, the court should

rehear the issue, should reconsider its decision and issue a
revised decision disallowing hidden and unintentional liens in
rental agreements.
QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REHEARING
Did the Utah Court of Appeals misapprehend the Utah common law
regarding contractual liens and Article Nine of the Utah Uniform
Commercial Code (UCC) by declaring the lease term "FURNITURE,
FIXTURES AND PERSONAL PROPERTY OF THE TENANT MAY NOT BE REMOVED
FROM THE PREMISES UNTIL RENT OR OTHER CHARGES ARE FULLY PAID" a
valid contractual lien and a security interest?
ARGUMENT
A.

THE LEASE LANGUAGE DID NOT CREATE A CONTRACTUAL LIEN
This court erred in finding that the Butters-Jackson lease

contained a contractual lien on all of the tenants' personal
property to secure payment of rent. While correct in citing
Citizens Bank v. Elks Blda.,N,V,, 663 P.2d 56, 59 (Utah 1983) for
the proposition that parties may by contract establish a lien to
secure payment of rentf that case held that a contractual lien
agreement must: (1)

"identify the property to be charged, and (2)

make clear that the lien is to secure payment of the debt in
question."

The Court then cited a number of cases as examples;

however, each of them specifically and expressly provides that a
"lien" is granted in some property. This actually formed the basis
for the holding in that case: no contractual lien existed where the
2

lease simply said that if the tenant was in default, all of their
property became the landlord's.

This language is similar to the

present case# where the landlords, with the blessing of the trial
court, have seized and held all of the tenants' property and can
presximably sell or retain it. Citizens Bank requires the opposite
result here.
Other cases have held that the language creating a lien must
state clearly an intention to do so and some have required "strict
proof" of such an intention to create a lien. See

Cherno v. Dutch

American Mercantile Corporation, 353 F.2d 147, 153 (2d Cir. 1965);
Wellbro Building Company v. McConnico, 421 P.2d 837, 839 (Ok.
1966):
In order that a lien may be created by a contract,
express or implied, it is generally necessary that the
language of the contract or the attendant circumstances
should clearly indicate an intention of the parties to
create a lien on the specific property, and should show
a specific charge on or appropriation of, that property;
and if it is intended to create a lien at the time of the
execution of the contract, the words creating the lien
should be in praesenti.
(quoting 53 C.J.S. Liens § 2(b) p. 835).

3

The language in the

Wellbro lease * illustrates what is

required to show the parties' clear intention to create a lienf and
clearly authorizes seizure and sale of the tenant's property. Such
language is notably absent here.
Even the summarizing language of the court in Frisco Joes,
Inc. v. Peav, 558 P.2d 1327, 1329 (Utah 1977), which never quoted
the actual lease language, was more specific, and provided that,
"any unpaid rent would be a lien against any of plaintiff's
personal property, which was not to be removed until all rent was
paid."(emphasis added).

In contrast, the language here does not

even contain the word "lien," nor does it specifically identify any
property. This court should not supply terms to create a lien when
the circumstances do not show a clear intent by the parties to do
so, especially when the unintended result of such a lien is the
loss of all rights to exempt property.
B.

THE JACKSON LEASE DID NOT CREATE A SECURITY INTEREST
1.

No valid security agreement exists.

While the common law governing contractual liens requires
intention and specificity for a lien to be established, that
1

.

The lease language creating the lien provided:
... Lessee waives all right of exemption from
sale or seizure under distress or execution
that he now or hereafter has by virtue of any
law exempting personal property from seizure
and sale and hereby gives lessor full power,
authority and right to take and seize any
personal property, whether exempt by law or
not, and sell the same or any part in
satisfaction of said rent and damages.

Wellbro Building Company, 421 P.2d at 839.

4

requirement comes from another source as well: Article 9 of the
UCC.

As will be seen in the following discussion, the Butters-

Jackson lease fares poorly when analyzed as an Article 9 security
agreement.2
Under the law of secured transactions, a security interest can
be created by a security agreement.

Thus, the Code provides:

'Security agreement' means an agreement which creates or
provides for a security interest.
Utah Code § 70A-9-105(l)(1). In this case the only document that
could be a security agreement is the lease. Therefore, that lease
must be reviewed to determine whether it meets all the requirements
of a security agreement under Article 9.3
The Tenth Circuit has interpreted the "creates or provides
for" terminology of UCC § 9-105 as requiring "language specifically
granting a security interest in collateral."

Pontchartrain State

Bank, 684 F.2d at 706.

2

.
A security agreement must be interpreted against the
party that drafted it; in this case, the landlords. In re Greives,
81 B.R. 912, 952 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1987).
3

.
The Tenth Circuit has noted that traditionally a security
agreement is contained in a separate security instrument. However,
some courts have construed other documents, such as promissory
notes or financing statements, as security agreements if they
otherwise satisfy the requirements of Article 9 and contain
language creating or providing for a security interest.
(Citations omitted).
Pontchartrain State Bank v. Poulson, 684 F.2d 704, 705 (10th Cir.
1982).
5

There is no language in the Butters-Jackson lease which comes
close to satisfying the requirements of Article 9 for the creation
of a security interest• The words "grants," "security interest" or
"security agreement" do not appear anywhere in the lease.

The

reason for this is simple: the parties never intended to create an
Article 9 security agreement.

If the parties did not so intend,

the court should not create such an agreement by supplying missing
terms or by liberally interpreting the language of the lease so as
to find a security agreement.
2.
No enforceable security agreement exists because the
description of the property is inadequate.
Even assuming arguendo that the language passes the § 9-105
test for granting a security interest, it fails a further crucial
test under Utah Code § 70A-9-203.

This section of Article 9

provides, in relevant part, that a security interest

is not

enforceable unless three elements exist:
(a) the collateral is in the possession of the secured
party pursuant to agreement, or the debtor has signed a
security agreement which contains a description of the
collateral . . .;
(b) value has been given; and
(c) the debtor has rights in the collateral.
Utah Code § 70A-9-203(l).
the collateral

4

In this case, the tenants had rights in

and "value" in the form of the leasehold had been

given. It is the first requirement that presents an insurmountable

4

.
At least in the property that the tenants owned at the
inception of the lease. The problem of an apparent grant of a
security interest in as yet unacquired items, in violation of the
UCC, is discussed later in this section.
6

obstacle to the lease being treated as a security agreement.
First, the tenants' property was not in the landlords' possession
pursuant to agreement.

Therefore, to satisfy Utah Code § 70A-9-

203(1)(a) the lease must contain a description of the collateral
that is sufficient under Article 9.
The designation of the collateral as "furniture, fixtures and
personal property" is not a sufficient description for Article 9
purposes.

Utah Code § 70A-9-110 provides:

For the purposes of this chapter any description of
personal property or, except as otherwise required by
Subsection (1) of Section 70A-9-402 relating to the
contents of a financing statement, real estate is
sufficient whether or not it is specific if it reasonably
identifies what is described.
By its own terms this definition precludes an argument that the
term "personal property" is a sufficient description of collateral.
By using the phrase "any description of personal property" as the
opening premise of Section 9-110, the drafters of Article 9 were
declaring that personal property must be described in a security
agreement.

Otherwise, the section is illogical.

There is virtually uniform agreement in the case law that the
term "personal property" is insufficient for describing collateral
in a security agreement.

In In re Boogie Enterprises. Inc.. 866

F.2d 1172, 1174 (9th Cir. 1989) the court reviewed whether a
reference to "personal property" in a financing statement5 was
5

.
A financing statement is used to perfect a security
interest created by a security agreement. Utah Code § 70A-9-302.
A financing statement is sufficient if, among other things, it
"contains a statement indicating the types, or describing the
items, of collateral." Utah Code § 70A-9-402(l). As discussed in
First National Bank v. First Security Bank of Montana, 721 P.2d
7

sufficient to perfect a security interest in settlement proceeds.
The court held that it did not, concluding:
The weight of authority indicates that financing
statements under the Uniform Commercial Code must
describe collateral with greater precision than that
furnished by the term "personal property."
A number of other courts have reached the same conclusion: See, In
re Fuoua, 461 F.2d 1186, 1188 (10th Cir. 1972) (the phrase "all
personal property" was insufficient to perfect a security interest
in livestock, feed, and farming equipment); In re H.L. Bennett, 588
F.2d 389, 392 (3d Cir. 1978) (the phrase "all assets as contained in
the security agreement" was too vague to satisfy §9-402); Lehigh
Press, Inc. v. National Bank of Georgia, 389 S.E.2d 376 (Ga. App.
1989)(the phrase "all personal property" failed to indicate the
types or describe the items of collateral in which a security
interest was taken); Becker v. Bank of Barron, 53 B.R. 450 (W.D.
Wise. 1985)(the phrase "all farm personal property" approached the
"super-generic and did not reasonably identify the collateral);
Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Halberstadt, 425 N.W. 2d 429 (la. App.
1988).

1270, 1273 (Mont. 1986), the written description of collateral
serves different purposes in the security agreement and the
financing statement.
Because of the differing purposes, it is generally agreed that
the description of collateral requirement for security agreements
is stricter than for financing statements.Landen v. PCA of
Midlands, 737 P.2d 1325 (Wyo. 1987); State v. Woodward, 675 P.2d
1007, 1010 (N.M. App. 1983) ("Because the security agreement
identifies the items of collateral, greater particularity is
required than in the financing statement.").
8

The In re Boogie court concluded:
We agree with the analysis of those courts and of
Professor Gilmore. Section 70A-9-402's requirement of
identification by "types" or "items" obliges the drafter
of a financing statement to designate the collateral for
a loan with greater specificity than the language
"personal property" provides.
"Personal property"
encompasses
all of the items—including
general
intangibles, among others—covered by the division of the
Code regulating secured transactions.
(Citation
omitted). The term refers to essentially everything that
a creditor can perfect an interest in pursuant to the
Code.
"Personal property" cannot satisfy § 9402 's
requirement of identification of assets by "types" or
"items" because "personal property" refers to no more and
no less than every kind of collateral perfectible under
the statute.
If the language "personal property" were sufficient
to perfect a security interest, creditors would never
need to use any other language to designate collateral.
(Emphasis in the original).
In re Boogie Enterprises, 866 F.2d at 1174-75.

Given their

different purposes, and the generally more lenient approach to
language describing collateral

in a financing

statement, the

court's condemnation of the term "personal property" supports a
fortiori the rejection of "personal property" as a sufficient term
for describing collateral in a security agreement.
Related to the issue of a sufficient description of the
collateral under § 9-203 is the issue of after-acquired property.
Article 9 permits the parties to secure an obligation by afteracquired collateral but that agreement must be stated in the
agreement.

Utah Code § 70A-9-204. In this case, there is no such

statement in the lease, yet the trial court, and this court's
initial opinion, allowed the landlord to seize and hold all
property in possession of the tenants at the end of the lease,
without any concern about whether some or all of the property
9

allegedly pledged to secure the rent was even present or in the
possession of the tenants at the outset of the lease.
It should be clear that questions about what property was
after-acquired cannot be answered, because the language which the
court found to create a security interest is simply too broad and
nondescriptive.

Acceptance of the terms "furniture, fixtures and

personal property" as satisfying § 9-203 plays havoc with wellestablished principles of law developed under Article 9 and gives
a blank check to landlords which could be easily abused to the
detriment of innocent tenants.
C.

THE LEASE TERM PURPORTING TO GIVE LANDLORDS A SECURITY
INTEREST IS UNCONSCIONABLE
The UCC at Utah Code §70A-2-302 prohibits unconscionable terms

in

a

contract.

The

Utah

Supreme

Court

has

held

that

unconscionability includes the absence of a meaningful choice on
the part of one of the parties together with contract terms which
are unreasonably favorable to the other party. Bekins Bar V Ranch
v. Huth. 664 P.2d 455 (Utah 1983).
The tenants signed the landlords' lease during a severe
housing shortage.

At the time in question, there was a severe

shortage of available housing in the Ogden, Weber County area. The
tenants had no choice regarding what terms would be included in the
lease because of the tight housing market and the form contract
that was provided.

The subject paragraph was just another of a

typical boiler-plate, closely printed lease agreement that favored
the owner.

For example, the lease term was for nine months and 21

days, yet the owner, in addition to holding the tenants' personal
10

property for nonpayment of rent or other charges, could terminate
the lease, for any reason, ". . . with 10 days written
notice. . . . "
To claim that the tenants had a meaningful choice in signing
a lease that contained the subject clause during a tight housing
market is to strip Bekins Bar V of its intended meaning.

Jackson

had no meaningful choice when she affixed her signature on the
Butters lease.

The subject clause contained in the lease should,

therefore, be declared unconscionable.
D.

ALLOWING UNINTENDED SECURITY AGREEMENTS IN LEASES WHICH
ALLOW THE SEIZURE OF HOUSEHOLD GOODS VIOLATES IMPORTANT
PUBLIC POLICY OBJECTIVES
In P.H. v. Oliver, 818 P.2d 1018, 1022 (Utah 1991), the court

allowed waiver of the implied warranty of habitability only with a
separate signed disclosure, requiring an express waiver for public
policy reasons.

The same should be true here.

Before a tenant

gives up rights to personal property, including exempt property, it
seems reasonable that such waiver be express, clear, separately
signed,

if not barred altogether.

Here there is simply no

indication that such a waiver was intended at all, yet this court
enforced it, allowing landlord to seize and hold all of tenants'
property, solely based on the "contractual lien." This would seem
to violate the public policy set forth in P.H. v. Oliver.
Another indicator of the "wrong road" the initial decision
leads

to

is

Commission.

found

in the regulations

of the Federal Trade

The FTC's Trade Regulation Rule Concerning Credit

Practices, 16 C.F.R. § 444.2(a)(4), prohibits non-possessory, non11

purchase money security interests in consumers' household goods.
This regulation declares it an unfair act or practice for a lender
or retail seller directly or indirectly to take or receive from a
consumer an obligation that:
constitutes or contains a nonpossessory security interest
in household goods other than a purchase money security
interest.
Household goods includes: "clothing, furniture, appliances,
one radio and one television, linens, china, crockery, kitchenware,
and personal effects (including wedding rings) of the consumer and
his or her dependents . . ."16 C.F.R. § 444.l(i).

These are

exactly the kind of items that were seized and held with the lower
court's blessing here.

While the FTC Rule applies to finance

companies, credit unions, retailers
directly apply to landlords.

and others, it does not

The policy objectives it set out to

achieve are directly impacted here, however.

As one treatise put

it:
While the collateral has little economic value as
collateral, the FTC has found that the threat of
repossession . . . of such goods provides creditors with
a powerful psychological lever. In fact, the FTC claimed
in the early 1980's that threats of repossession of
household goods security may have been the single most
common form of creditor harassment.
. . . The FTC has found that these threats cause great
emotional suffering, anxiety, guilt and distress, leading
to illness and strain on family relations. . . .
National Consumer Law Center, Repossessions and Foreclosures
(3d ed. 1995), at 100.

The public policy should lead to a

prohibition or strict reading of similar clauses in Utah leases,
not the blanket approval this court gave such clauses in its
initial opinion.
12

CONCLUSION
By finding a contractual lien and an unintended security
interest, the court has departed both from recognized UCC law and
Utah public policy concerning leases. In addition to resolving an
issue that has great public importance in residential leases and
providing a seeming end-run around a relatively new statute, these
issues were not briefed or argued. Rehearing should be granted to
argue these issues. While a valid intentional security agreement
and contractual lien may be included in a lease, this court's
broad, sweeping approval of the vague and unintended clause here
will result in frequent seizures of tenants' property, increased
litigation around such clauses and seizures, failure to follow the
eviction statute and a bad public policy which could extend to UCC
cases.

Rehearing should be granted to fully develop and resolve

these issues.
Martin S. Blaustein, as attorney for the Appellants, certifies
that he submits this petition in good faith and not for delay.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this X&
1996.

day of
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UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC.
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellants

MARTIN S/ECAtiiSTEIN
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